IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
_____________________________________________________
No. 96-2188
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
PEDRO RIVERA,
Defendant, Appellant.
______________________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO
RICO
(Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, United States
District Judge)
_______________________________________________________
MOTION BY THE MARITIME LAW
ASSOCIATION OF
THE UNITED STATES TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE
BRIEF AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLANT PEDRO RIVERA
_______________________________________________________
Movant,
The Maritime Law Association of the United States (hereinafter “MLA”), moves
the Court for permission to file an amicus
curiae brief in support of the
Appellant Pedro Rivera.
This Court has ordered that this amicus curiae brief be filed on or before August 12, 1997.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The MLA is a nationwide law association
founded in 1899, with a membership of about 3,600 attorneys, law professors,
and other distinguished members of the maritime community. Its attorney
members, most of whom are specialists in admiralty law,
represent all maritime interests – ship owners, charterers, cargo interests,
port authorities, seamen, longshoremen, passengers, underwriters, and other
maritime claimants and defendants.
The purposes of the MLA are stated in its
Articles of Incorporation:
The objectives of the Association shall
be to advance reforms in the Maritime Law of the United States, to facilitate
justice in its administration, to promote uniformity in its enactment and
interpretation, to furnish a forum for the discussion and consideration of
problems affecting the Maritime Law and its administration, to participate as a
constituent member of the Comité Maritime International and as an
affiliated organization of the American Bar Association, and to act with other
associations in efforts to bring about a greater harmony in the shipping laws, regulations
and practices in different nations.
In furtherance of these objectives, the
MLA has sponsored a wide-range of legislation dealing with maritime matters
during its 98 years of existence, including the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
the Federal Arbitration Act,
and, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The MLA has also cooperated with
Congressional committees in the formulation of other maritime legislation.
The MLA also participates in several
projects of a maritime legal nature undertaken by agencies of the United
Nations, including its Commissions on Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), and Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”), and works closely with the International Maritime
Organization (“IMO”). The MLA actively
participates as one of some fifty-five national maritime law associations
constituting the Comite Maritime International in a movement to achieve maximum
international uniformity in maritime law through the medium of international
conventions.
It is the policy of the MLA to
participate as amicus curiae only when important issues of
maritime law or practice are involved and only when the effect of the Court’s
decision may be substantial. The
By-laws of the MLA require that its participation as amicus curiae must be
approved by the President, in consultation with the First and Second
Vice-Presidents, and then submitted to the Board of Directors. The By-laws provide that such approval must
be given sparingly and only when certain criteria are met. In this case, the vote of the Board of
Directors to participate was unanimous.
One of the criteria set forth in the MLA By-laws is,
“Whether or not the outcome of the litigation would affect the meaning of a law
or treaty advanced by the Association.” This case concerns the meaning of chapter
109 of Title 46 of the United States Code.
The MLA participated in drafting the revision of Title 46 starting in
1981. This was a coordinated effort
between the United States Coast Guard and the MLA and many MLA members were
assigned to review designated portions of the proposed revisions. Former MLA President Gordon Paulsen was the
coordinator for this effort and he testified before Congress on two occasions
in support of the revisions. Accordingly, the main issue in this appeal
falls directly within the criteria set forth in the MLA By-laws because the
outcome of the litigation affects the meaning of a provision in a statute
advanced by the Association. As one of
the parties that actively participated in the drafting, amending and enactment
of the revisions to Title 46, the MLA has an interest in seeing that the
revisions are properly read and interpreted according to their intent and
purposes.
Respectfully
submitted,
JAMES F. MOSELEY
President,
The Maritime Law ________________________
Association of the United States PATRICK
J. BONNER
501
W. Bay Street Counsel
of Record
Jacksonville
FL 32202 80 Pine Street
(904)
358-9190 New
York, New York 10005
(212) 425-1900
_________________________
ROBERT B. PARRISH
Counsel of Record
501 W. Bay Street
Jacksonville, FL 32202
(904) 356-1306
Attorneys
for the Maritime Law
Association
of the United States,
Movant
for Leave to File Brief
as
Amicus Curiae
BRIEF OF THE MARITIME LAW ASSOCIATION OF
THE UNITED STATES, AMICUS CURIAE,
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT
The Maritime Law Association of the
United States (hereinafter “MLA”) respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of appellant Pedro Rivera.
INTRODUCTION
The memorandum of the MLA which follows addresses
only question (a) of the Court’s order of May 29, 1997 granting rehearing en banc. The MLA has not reviewed
the record below and takes no position on question (b) or on any other issue of
the case.
SUMMARY
Prior to 1983, certain preconditions had
to be met before bringing a prosecution for sending an unseaworthy vessel to
sea. The intent of the 1983 recodification of Title 46 was to make no
substantive change in the law. Therefore,
the preconditions set forth in the other sections of Chapter 109 of
Title 46 must be complied with before bringing a prosecution under § 10908
ARGUMENT
I
Unless there is clear legislative intent
to the contrary, Chapter 109 and Section 10908 must be read in a manner to
preserve established principles of maritime law.
We must be
guided by the Supreme Court in reading statutes dealing with maritime law. The Supreme Court has instructed that
“[S]tatutes which invade the common law or general maritime law are to be read
with a presumption favoring the retention of long established and familiar
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” Isbrandtsen
Co v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
Appellee argues
that § 10908 should be read by itself, without
the preconditions contained in the remainder of Chapter 109. Appellant argues that all the parts of
Chapter 109 should be read together in determining the meaning of § 10908. The MLA supports Appellant’s
reading of the statute which is in accord with the legislative history and
which retains long established and familiar principles of the general maritime
law.
The principles
underlying Chapter 109 are long established and familiar to admiralty
lawyers. The predecessor statute was
first enacted on July 21, 1840. This law was amended in 1884
and again in 1898. The statute remained unchanged for the next
85 years until the aforementioned recodification of Title 46 in 1983. For the next 12 or so years, the statute was
read in the traditional manner and the MLA believes that it was not until 1994
or 1995 that the Appellee decided to try to use the statute in a novel
way. This novel use of the statute
adversely affects traditional admiralty principles.
A
maritime law right which would be adversely affected if Appellee’s
interpretation of § 10908 was to be held the law of the land is the right of
the vessel owner to file for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (
Limitation Act). After a casualty, the
vessel owner may petition the Court to limit its liability to the value of the
vessel and pending freight if the casualty occurred without the privity or
knowledge of the vessel owner. The
Limitation Act has been an integral part of the maritime law since it was
enacted in 1851. The Appellee’s reading
of § 10908 would have a chilling effect on the use of this procedure. Few, if
any, Admiralty lawyers would recommend this procedure to their clients if an
adverse finding on the privity and knowledge issue would form prima facie evidence of a crime. It would be ridiculous for an owner to
invite the attorneys for the claimants to examine all its records, depose its
employees, and do full discovery on the privity and knowledge issue if this
evidence would then be used by a government
attorney in an indictment. Filing a limitation complaint might be cited as a
waiver of privilege and could provide a basis for the lawyer for the claimants to use his experts to prove the
elements of a violation of § 10908.
This could cause Admiralty judges, who
have years of experience in deciding issues of privity and knowledge, to
examine traditional notions of privity and knowledge. Their findings could form
the basis for an indictment. The privity and knowledge of the unseaworthy
condition that are sufficient to deny limitation under existing case law may
not be so severe as to reach the mens
rea
required for a criminal charge. However, if limitation is denied, there
would be a prima facie criminal case under § 10908.
The
Limitation Act was enacted to foster the American Merchant Marine. The Appellee’s interpretation of § 10908
defeats this purpose. Only American
flag operators have criminal exposure under § 10908. This chapter does not
apply to foreign flag operators. Therefore foreign flag operators would remain
free to use our courts and the Limitation Act, thus obtaining a competitive
advantage over U.S. flag companies. This could serve as an impetus for American
flag owners to “flag out” or shift the flags of their vessels to flag of
convenience nations such as Liberia or Vanuatu. This would be contrary to the essential public policy of
maintaining a strong American flag fleet for use in time of war.
There
are many anomalies in Appellee’s interpretation of the statute. American owners operating fishing vessels or yachts
have no criminal exposure because § 10908 does not apply to them. The section applies to vessels going to sea
so arguably harbor craft would be exempt. Section 10908 does not exempt
recreational vessels which would be covered under the broad definition of
“vessel of the United States” set forth at 46 U.S.C § 2101(46). Thus, a similar unseaworthy
condition with notice on a fishing vessel, yacht or harbor craft such as a tug
and barge, would not give rise to criminal liability under § 10908.
However, if the harbor craft made a voyage from New York to
Philadelphia, a simple Jones Act/unseaworthiness claim could subject the same
owner to criminal liability. The dangers to seamen would be the same but the
potential penalty for unseaworthiness would be completely different.
A
carefully worded and comprehensive maritime criminal statute exists. Section
2302 of Title 46 states that persons who operate a vessel in a grossly
negligent manner endangering the life, limb or property of a person commit a
misdemeanor. This statute applies to vessels on waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and to vessels owned in the United States on
the high seas. Thus, foreign vessels in this country are covered as well as the
vessels mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
This is a more traditional criminal statute using a criminal standard,
not a maritime, civil standard, and it applies to vessels across the
board. An applicable criminal statute
already exists and there is no basis to radically change the maritime law.
The
term “seaworthiness” which for centuries has been used to allocate losses after
a casualty, could provide the basis to prosecute anyone in the marine business
involved in a casualty. The concept of seaworthiness is a common thread running
through many areas of maritime law. In
addition to the duty of providing a seaman with a seaworthy vessel,
a carrier owes a duty to cargo to exercise due diligence to make the ship
seaworthy, an owner
owes a charterer the warranty of seaworthiness either implied by law
or under the terms of most charter parties;
in order to recover in general average, a vessel owner must use due diligence
to make the vessel seaworthy
and there is a warranty that an insured vessel is seaworthy implied by law
or in most marine insurance policies. A key issue in much of the maritime
litigation over the past century was whether a particular vessel was seaworthy
or not. The findings of unseaworthiness in most of
these cases could support a criminal charge under the interpretation of § 10908
put forth by Appellee. In effect,
admiralty lawyers trying to prove unseaworthiness will become private
prosecutors who would be proving the elements of a crime. After an admiralty judge, panel of
arbitrators or jury found unseaworthiness, Appellee could pick and choose which
“violators” of § 10908 to prosecute.
The
procedures set forth in Chapter 109 were meant to be even handed and to be
controlled by the Court. If the seaman went to court and lost, the owner has
remedies. If the seaman won, there would be certain consequences for the owner.
Under § 10903, for example, if the complaint of
the crew was without foundation or without reasonable grounds, the master or
owner could deduct damages as determined by a judge from the wages of the
complaining seaman. Under appellee’s interpretation, this section is
superfluous. The seaman could complain to a U.S. attorney who would bring a
prosecution under § 10908. The owner would have no recourse if the charges were
without foundation.
II
The plain meaning rule cannot be used to
create a crime of unseaworthiness.
Laws
are made by Congress and not by rules
of statutory interpretation. Congress
never debated, held hearings on or considered enacting a separate crime of
unseaworthiness with the elements set forth in § 10908. This new “crime” is the creation of
imaginative government counsel in this particular case. Its support does not come from the
legislative history, general maritime law or prior law. Instead, its sole basis is an attempted improper
use of the plain meaning rule. This
rule must be modified by the “familiar
rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its
makers.” Muniz v. Hoffman, 422
U.S. 454, 470 (1975) quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143
U.S 457, 459 (1892).
Due
to the tremendous amount of time that the Maritime Law Association and its
members spent on the recodification of Title 46, the MLA believes it understands
the spirit and intention of the “makers” (those responsible for the
recodification) of this particular law.
The role of the MLA in this project is best set forth by Admiral Lusk of
the Coast Guard in response to a question from Representative Studds, the
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation:
Mr. Studds. What groups were within reasonably regular touch with you during
the drafting process?
Admiral Lusk: Probably the most deeply involved was the Maritime Law Association. We had really superb support from them.
The support given by the MLA was
amplified in a written response to the above question made by the Coast Guard
at a later date.
As comments from the membership of the
MLA and other interested parties began to reach the drafters, the Coast Guard
prepared a description of the drafting effort which appeared in the June 1981
issue of “The Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council,” a monthly magazine
which reaches more that 6,000 maritime subscribers. As a result of the “Proceedings” article quarters previously not
heard from examined the proposal and offered comments. Many of the comments were dealt with by
direct communication between the drafters and those submitting ideas. Written correspondence was constantly
augmented by informal meetings and telephone conversations. Additionally, Coast Guard officers regularly
met with the leadership of the MLA in New York to report on the progress of the
effort and to assist in the preparation of information to be distributed to the
entire MLA membership.
The
efforts of the MLA and in particular its Committee on Navigation and Coast
Guard Matters were also acknowledged by the Coast Guard in the March 1982 issue
of The Proceedings of the Marine Safety
Council.
[C]opies of the legislative proposal and
supporting documents were delivered to dozens of individuals and groups. As these organizations began their analyses
of the proposal, the Coast Guard contracted the prestigious Maritime Law
Association of the United States (MLA) and asked for its assistance. The MLA, an organization which has an acute
interest in establishing uniform laws, expressed immediate support for the
goals of the project through its President, John W. Sims, Esq. of New Orleans.
In November 1981 the Chief Maritime
International law Division at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters was invited to
address the MLA’s Committee on Coast Guard and Navigation at its annual meeting
in New York. As a result of that
meeting and other discussions, dozens of members of the Maritime Law
Association examined portions of the draft proposal and provided the Coast
Guard with their critical comments…
By the time this article is published, a
draft of what is likely the largest single legislative initiative in the Coast
Guard’s history will have begun its voyage to Capitol Hill. With the Coast Guard’s drafting effort
drawing to a close, it is appropriate that notice be taken of some of the
dozens of individuals and organizations who contributed in a most significant
way to the production of a proposal which may in part simplify the ‘maze of
regulation’. They are James F. Moseley,
Esq., of Jacksonville, Mark O. Kasanin, Esq. of San Francisco, Antonio J.
Rodriguez, Esq. of New Orleans, Austin P. Olney, Esq. of Washington, DC, Morton H. Clark, Esq. of Norfolk, George R.
Daily, Esq. of New York, E.V. Greenwood, Esq. of Houston, John H. Hanninen,
Esq. of Cleveland, Robert R. Preston, Esq., also of Cleveland, Joseph Newton,
Esq. of Houston, Raymond T. Letull, Esq. of Philadelphia, Captain T. E. Lohrey,
Jr., USN, Force Judge Advocate, United States Pacific Fleet, Charles A. Bedell,
Esq. of Houston, George W. Healy III, Esq. of New Orleans, Mr. Bryan Chiasson
of the American Waterway Operators, Mr. Ben Webster of the joint Maritime Congress,
Mr. Julian Singman, Esq. of the Maritime Institute for Research and Industrial
Development, Rear Admiral W. M. Benkert, USCG (Retired), of the American
Institute of Merchant Shipping, Mr. Edward H. Middleton of the Maritime
Institute for Resource and Industrial Development, Mr. Frank Pecquex of the
Seafarers International Union, Arthur Abarbanel, Esq., and Donald L. Sapir,
Esq. of New York, Mr. James L. Henry of the Transportation Institute, Mr.
Elwood Hampton of the National Maritime Union, Ms. Barbara Bristilo of the
AFL-CIO Maritime Committee, and Ms. Mel Hall-Crawford of Crowley Maritime
Corporation. A special note of thanks
to Gordon W. Paulsen, Esq. and Kenneth H. Volk, Esq. of New York for their
efforts to make the comments of the membership of the Maritime Law Association
available to the Coast Guard.”
The MLA met with the drafters initially in New Orleans and then
had subsequent meetings in New York between the Coast Guard and the MLA
Committee Chairmen. This resulted in a draft being widely distributed among the
members of the Association. Numerous
MLA members, including many of those listed above, communicated their comments
to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard
officers regularly met with the leadership of the MLA to report on the progress
of the effort. On January 20, 1982,
there was a meeting at the Coast Guard Headquarters attended by Gordon Paulsen,
then President of the MLA for the purpose of finalizing the critical comments. Following receipt of these comments, a new
draft was prepared and distributed.
The
position of the MLA throughout the drafting process was that the recodification
project should produce no substantive changes in the law. Mr. Paulsen confirmed that this goal had
been accomplished when he testified before Congress on April 28, 1983. Mr. Paulsen stated:
Although the current MLA
involvement began in the spring of 1981, the subject of revision of Title 46
had been in the talking stage for many years.
Our Committee on Navigation and Coast Guard matters has played an
especially active role when the proposals were put forth in 1981. I was First Vice President of the MLA and
agreed to act as coordinator of the various efforts which cut across many
aspects of the work of our members and MLA committees. Many MLA members were assigned to review
designated portions of the proposed revisions and to make appropriate
comments….
The basic underlying
principle of the revisions was that no substantive changes to the existing law
were desired. The purpose of the
revision being to reorganize, and, in some instances, rephrase existing law to
make it readily accessible and comprehensible and to eliminate those sections
which were outdated and no longer viable.
Our task as the Maritime Law
Association of the United States involved, not only checking to see that the
draft properly reflected the statutes from which the draft derived, but to make
sure that nothing of current or future substantive importance was omitted from
the source material and that there was no substantive change in existing
law. The job entailed a careful study
of the legislative intent, always with an eye towards preserving present
practice and policy as reflected in the Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large. While many pertinent provisions of law have
been freely reworded and rearranged, every precaution has been taken against
disturbing existing rights, privileges, duties, and functions. This we believe to have been
accomplished. However, the legislative
intent is so clear that attempts to read substantive changes into the new
legislation would be defeated and that important court decisions decided under
earlier statutes would be valid precedents under the revised Title 46
At the Congressional hearings, the Coast
Guard agreed with the position taken by Mr. Paulsen.
Mr. Studds. Very good. The good news
is that this is my last question.
Some have expressed concern that this
recodification may prompt a series of long and expensive court cases initiated
for the purpose of testing the judicial interpretation of terms and concepts
contained in the revised law. Do you
see any risk that this sort of scenario might enfold as a result of the
enactment of this bill?
Admiral Lusk. I don’t think so sir. I
understood that it was to be made so clear everywhere that we weren’t trying to
make any substantive changes of a controversial nature, and I understood there
would probably be some sort of a savings provision. I don’t anticipate any.
The Committee Report also belies the
assertion of Appellee that Congress intended to create a new crime of
unseaworthiness. This new crime is not
mentioned anywhere in the Report but the Report does state:
Finally, some specific changes have been
made to make the law more effective.
For example, civil penalties have been substituted in many cases for
criminal penalties in order to facilitate the prosecution of these cases. …
Although the Committee realized that many
substantive changes would inevitably be made in any effort to simplify and
modernize the maritime safety laws, it intended to make no changes that would
prove to be detrimental to or adversely impact upon the industry governed by
these laws. More specifically it sought
to insure that this bill not take away any existing rights, benefits or
privileges from any person, nor place any greater duties or obligations on any
person.
Despite the foregoing, Appellee
apparently argues that Congress intended to enact a new penal statute in which
the government must prove three elements to prove the crime. Even though the recodification of Title 46
contains almost five pages of definitions, it is Appellee’s position that
Congress intended to use the long standing definition of unseaworthiness, a
definition never used before in a criminal case. This is wrong.
The
legislative history shows that no such major change was intended by Congress
and that there was absolutely no consideration given to establishing a new
maritime crime of unseaworthiness with its far reaching implications for this
nation’s maritime industry. The MLA strongly
urges that it was the spirit and intent of Congress to read § 10908 to require
satisfaction of the preconditions set forth in the preceding sections of
chapter 109 prior to prosecution thereunder as was done in the past. If Congress intended to enact a new crime of
unseaworthiness, something would have been mentioned in the legislative history
and prospective defendants would have been placed on notice pursuant to this
country’s traditional notions of fair play.
III
Other rules of statutory interpretation
take precedence over the plain meaning role.
The Senate Report correctly points out
that the plain meaning rule does not govern codification statutes. It states that in the usual kind of
amendatory legislation, “a change of language is intended to change
substance. In a codification statute,
however, the courts uphold the contrary presumption: no change in law is
intended unless clearly expressed.”
Three Supreme Court cases are cited to support this principle: Fourco Glass
Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957); Tidewater
Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162 (1973) and Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454,
467-74 (1975). The purported change in the law urged by appellee is not
discussed in the Senate Report
which forces one to conclude that no change in this section was ever intended.
The 1983 recodification of Title 46
merely split §658 into §§ 10901, 10906 and 10908. The Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that “the change of
arrangement, which placed portions of what was originally a single section into
separated sections cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the
enactment. For it will not be inferred
that Congress in revising and consolidating the laws intended to change their
effect, unless such intention is clearly expressed.” Fourco, supra at 227, citing United States v. Ryder,
110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884); United States v. LeBris, 121 U.S. 278, 280
(1887); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 302 (1892); United
States v. Mason, 218 U.S 517, 525 (1910); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.
Co., 225 U.S. 187, 198-199 (1912).
Using § 10908 in this case is an
alteration of the scope and purpose of Chapter 109. Congress never intended this to be a catch-all statute which
would enable the government to pursue criminally virtually anyone “a party to”
a vessel. The Appellee’s use of the statute in this manner constitutes a
radical change in maritime law and should not be permitted.
Chapter
109 of Title 46 must be considered as a whole and Appellee cannot read § 10908
in a vacuum. In interpreting statutes,
this Court has set forth an easily understood standard. “Courts are bound to afford statutes a
practical, common sense reading … instead of culling selected words from a
statute’s text and inspecting them in an antiseptic laboratory setting, a Court
engaged in the task of statutory interpretation must examine the statute as a
whole, giving due weight to design, structure and purpose as well as to
aggregate language.” (Citations omitted) O’Connor v. Shalala, 79 F.3d
170, 176 (1st Cir. 1996).
Section 10908 cannot be read alone. Section 10901 binds the chapter
together. This section states that the
chapter is meant to apply to vessels of the United States with some
exceptions. Common sense requires that
the sections be read cumulatively. It
makes no sense to allow a fine of only $100 against the master if he does not
replace food certified as unfit for use with available proper food or uses
provisions certified to be unfit for use (§ 10902) but to allow a felony charge if
the same master is a party to a slip and fall unseaworthiness case.
If § 10908 is read in isolation, some of its
terms are subject to broad interpretations.
The section refers to a person who “is a party” to sending the vessel to
sea. If 10908 is read with the preceding sections, this language would mean the
person who refused to accept the endorsement of the judge or justice of the
peace on the surveyor’s report. If the
section is read in isolation, anyone arguably a party to sending an unseaworthy
vessel to sea could be a guilty party.
There is a presumption that no change in
the law was intended. If the statute is read as a whole, as it should be, there
is no change in the law. Therefore, it is the position of the MLA that the
statute should be read as a whole and § 10901 - 10907 should be preconditions
for bringing charges under § 10908. Any
other reading would be a major change in the maritime law, a change never
intended by the recodifiers of Title 46.
CONCLUSION
Congress never intended to change the substance of Chapter
109 of Title 46. There is a presumption that Congress did not intend to change
the law in the recodification of Title 46. If the chapter is read as a whole,
there is no change in the law. The prior law required that certain
preconditions be met in connection with prosecutions under this chapter. This
legislative scheme set forth in the
recodification continues with these preconditions which must be met by the
Appellee before bringing a prosecution.
Dated: August 11, 1997
Respectfully
submitted,
JAMES F. MOSELEY
President,
The Maritime Law ________________________
Association of the United States PATRICK
J. BONNER
501
W. Bay Street Counsel
of Record
Jacksonville
FL 32202 80 Pine Street
(904)
358-9190 New
York, New York 10005
(212) 425-1900
_________________________
ROBERT B. PARRISH
Counsel of Record
501 W. Bay Street
Jacksonville, FL 32202
(904) 356-1306
Attorneys
for the Maritime Law
Association
of the United States,
as Amicus Curiae
